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Introduction
Upon his return from work, a colleague of mine was buoyantly greeted by his ten-yearold daughter. She begged him to fetch his camcorder and come to her room, where she was playing with her sister-a karaoke of sorts in which they combined song and dance with typical kids' spells of laughter and fun. 'You need to tape us because when we'll become famous they may show this on television' his daughter explained with a sense of urgency. The children's motivation for being filmed betrays a sophisticated reflexivity of the camcorder as a tool for producing future memories. Even at a young age, children keenly apprehend the pliability of mediated experience; their father's film is not simply a registration of present fun activities, but a conscious steering of their future past. The camcorder constructs family life at the same time and by the same means as it constructs our memory of it; whereas the camcorder registers private lives, these images may help shape (future) public identity. The children's awareness was most likely triggered by contemporary television programs-anything from so-called reality TV and lost-relative quests to dating shows and celebrity interviews-deploying home video footage to represent a person's past life.
This scene helps articulate three levels of mediation at which the audiovisual construction of memory takes place. First, home movies could be considered mediated acts of cognition: minds instructing instruments to manufacture (desirable) images of personal or family life. Second, filming the children's play might be seen as the camera's registration of 'real' life-footage shot and stored for later reminiscence. And third, home videos may become visual resources in cinematic productions of remembrance; as the children in the above scene perfectly understand, the video camera shapes their individual or family's future past. These three levels of mediation structure of what I call 'cinematic hindsight': audiovisual retrospectives of remembered life as an aggregate of (actual or fictional) home videos and filmic (re)constructions. Cinematic hindsight could simply be considered a representational trope preferred by movie directors and anticipated by home movie creators. Many contemporary films, documentaries, and television series reframe (actual or fictive) home movie footage into cinematic productions, either as a technique to create the illusion of intimacy and personal authenticity, or as a meta-commentary on the intertwining of memory and media ( Van Dijck, 2004) . The incorporation of personal home videos in public film or television productions has gained a new dimension in light of recent technological transformations, particularly digitization.
However, cinematic hindsight is more than a technique of representation. The layered concept of cinematic hindsight can be theorized from at least two different perspectives. Following the footsteps of philosophers like Gilles Deleuze and Mark Hansen, we may primarily consider filmed memories to be convergences of mental projections and technological scripts, privileging the body as an information-filtering agent and studying memory construction at the junction of body and technology. On the other hand, we may adhere to social constructivists like James Moran who direct their inquiry from the intersection of technology and culture, connecting the technological apparatus to cultural forms, when trying to account for audiovisual registrations of personal memory. Both theoretical approaches acknowledge the significant impact of technological transformations when film and video recordings are replaced by digital tools.
The main goal of this article is to bring together these two seemingly divergent approaches and to argue that cinematic hindsight may be a fruitful analytical concept if theorized as a co-production of mind, technology, and culture. Filmic constructions of memory are concurrently embodied mental projections, enabled by media technologies, and embedded in cultural forms. Two examples of recent cinematic productions will ground this combined theory of cinematic hindsight. A close reading of the documentary production, CAPTURING THE FRIEDMANS, will show how cinematic hindsight should be understood at the intersection of video montage and cultural form, but for its ultimate affect depends on the subtle interchange of digital technologies and mental projections. Analysis of a recent science fiction movie, THE FINAL CUT, explores how audiovisual inscriptions of lived memory, even if generated by bio-engineered recording chips, are firmly anchored in the cultural molds dictated by Hollywood cinema.
Future memories as mental projections of the past
The above scene of playing children who demand the presence of their father's camera, shows they are keenly aware of the power of video footage in defining their future public image. As young as they are, they grasp the concept of raw images serving as input for mediated memories that have yet to take shape. Could such awareness be the result of the movie camera's 'infiltration' into their consciousness? Or rather, is their concept of audiovisual memory the result of the ubiquitous use of camcorders in their everyday lives? Perhaps their awareness of the future role of home videos is defined by the many movies and television productions which prominently feature recycled video footage from someone's personal past. Let me succinctly explore the various hypothetical angles each favoring a different explanation, to account for the complex interrelation between mind, technology and culture in the construction of filmic memory.
Some neurobiologists who study the physiological mechanisms of (autobiographical) memory concentrate on the brain as an explanatory framework, choose to ignore the constitutive function of technology or culture in the process of remembering. If referring to technology or culture at all, they typically use movies, screens, and cameras as metaphors to describe the intricate mechanism of human consciousness and memory. When neurobiologist Antonio Damasio (1999: 11) , for instance, speaks of a 'movie-in-the-brain,' he uses the term metaphorically: as if the brain were both a camera, a movie screen, a filmed production, and a moviegoer.
Without a proper analogy, it seems impossible to explain the complexity of the brain's involvement in configuring a sense of self over a period of time. However, the use of this metaphor presents a peculiar paradox. Apparently, we need a techno-cultural set of metaphors (movie, screen) to imagine a physiological process (memory, consciousness), whereas actual movies are obviously also the result of a complex brain-machine network involved in the cultural act of film production (scripting, directing, camera work, editing, watching, etc). Damasio's theory is understandably oblivious of actual movies as input for actual brains; he is simply disinterested in the role of the camera or other media technologies in 'equipping' the mind to produce images. The brain/mind is hierarchically offset from technology and culture; the latter two are mere conceptual aids in the neurobiological theory of 'movies-in-the-brain.' Deleuze (2003) has theorized the internalization of the film camera in the human mind to explain memories as filmic projections of the present. The 'matter' of memory, according to the French philosopher, emerges at the intersection of mind/brain and technology/materiality. In his book The Time-Image, Deleuze highlights the intimate relation between memory and cinema-between moving images in the mind and moving images on the screen. When Deleuze suggests that 'the brain is the screen' he does not mean this metaphorically but literally: recollection is inherently defined by the input of actual moving images which are always partly constructions of the brain (Flaxman, 2000; Kennedy, 2000; Bogue, 2003) . Whereas Damasio's 'moviein-the-brain' implies a figural equation-to understand the brain's mechanism in terms of film productions-Deleuze explicitly connects cognitive mechanisms to the movement-image of cinema. Cinema is as much a production of the individual mind as it is a production of a mechanical apparatus. Echoing Bergson, Deleuze distinguishes between different categories of images in motion: the perception-image, the affectionimage, and the action-image (Pisters 2003) . 'External images' act upon the mind and become 'internal images,' moving images that stir action or affection, converging into experience.
Memory, in Deleuze's concept, is never a retrieval of past images, but is always a function of the present-a function embodying the essential continuation of time.
Body and cinema are part of the same organic, connective system: just as the body constantly renews itself molecularly, images never remain the same when processed in an individual's mind. In other words, moving images produced by film are 'input' for the brain, always resulting in 'updated' output. Such dynamic concept of movementimage sharply contrasts semiotic theories that consider film footage as representations or signs. Image-perceptions of the present determine how actual images of the past are interpreted, an yet, both are inevitably injected with projections of the future: idealized images, virtual images, desire. It is instructive to quote Deleuze's words in full here:
But instead of a constituted memory, as function of the past which reports a story, we witness the birth of memory, as function of the future which retains what happens in order to make it the object to come of the other memory. …
[M]emory could never evoke and report the past if it had not already been constituted at the moment when past was still present, hence in an aim to come.
It is in fact for this reason that it is behavior: it is in the present that we make a memory, in order to make use of it in the future when the present will be past. (2003: 52) Films are imagined in the brain-a process involving the convergence of mental projections and technological scripts. If the past is a filmic product of the present, so is the future; according to Deleuze, memory is always in a 'state of becoming.'
The film apparatus is thus inseparable from the individual who deploys the camera to articulate a sense of connection between self and family or between self and the world-at-large. As a memory object, a home movie changes meaning each time it is seen, shown or reframed. The act of memory includes the actual shooting of the movie; the later use of home movies and video footage-even if unspecified-is already anticipated at the moment of shooting. In addition, home movies are never simply 'found footage' of the past: each time they are reviewed or recycled, they are 'edited' by the brain. Moving images, first shot and later edited, project the intricate timemovement of mental recollection so characteristic of the human mind; the mind's tendency to impact future remembrance is implicated in technologies of memory, particularly the movie camera. Deleuze's philosophical reflections stress the interdependency of the brain/mind and the technology/materiality of the camera in the act of memory. Applying his theory to specific (fiction) films, Deleuze minutely analyzes how the brain is engaged in articulating moving images produced by the cinema apparatus-an apparatus that only works because the anticipation of mental images is part of its technological script.
However, as we move into an age when the cinematic apparatus and the video image are gradually replaced by the multimedia apparatus and the virtual image, Deleuzian philosophy needs updating in several respects. As Mark Hansen (2004) contends, processes of digitization and virtualization call for a new concept of embodiment-the body's relation to image and its affects. Whereas Deleuze still accepts a distinction between perception and simulation-between 'external' and 'internal' images that stir action or affection, converging into experience-Hansen argues that our bodies, brought into contact with the digital image, experience the virtual through affect and sensation, rather than through techniques, forms, or aesthetics.
2 Drawing examples from digital art works and virtual reality environments,
Hansen counters Deleuze's neuroaesthetics and 'cinema-of-the-brain' with a concept in which the 'brain is no longer external to the image and is indeed no longer differentiated from an image at all ' (2004: 194) . Rather than talking about an affect caused by a technological (cinematic) apparatus, Hansen considers the digital apparatus to be an integral part of a new embodied experience: '[A]ffectivity is the privileged modality for confronting technologies that are fundamentally heterogeneous to our already constituted embodiment, our contracted habits and rhythms ' (2004: 133) . In other words, digital technologies call for an approach to cinematic hindsight that privileges the bodily basis of vision; the mind, he says, filters the information we receive to create images of the past, instead of simply receiving images as preexisting technical forms. In his excellent study of the home video, Moran has theorized the historical and technological specificity of what he calls the 'home mode'-the place of home movies (and later home videos) in a gradually changing media landscape. Rather than identifying the home movie according to its ontological purity or as a technical apparatus, Moran rethinks the 'home mode' as a historically changing effect of technological, social, and cultural determinations-a set of discursive codes that helps negotiate the meaning of private selves in response to their shared social environment.
The home mode, according to Moran, is not simply a technological device deployed in a private setting, but is defined as an active mode of media production representing everyday life: 'a liminal space in which practitioners may explore and negotiate the competing demands of their public, communal, and private personal identities ' (2002: 59) . The home mode articulates a generational continuity over time, providing a format for communicating family legends and stories, yet it concurrently adapts to technological transformations, such as the introduction of new types of equipment: first the movie camera, later the video, and more recently the digital camcorder. Moreover, the home mode is affected by social transformations such as the position of the family in western society (Zimmerman, 1995) . As Moran poignantly sums up: 'While we use these media audiovisually to represent family relations to ourselves, we also use family relations discursively to represent these media to each other ' (2002: 103) . The changing depictions of families on private as well as public screens, most notably television, are part and parcel of the socio-cultural transformation he is trying to sketch.
The intricate intertwining of technology and cultural form emerges even more poignantly in the age of camcorders, webcams and multimedia productions, where home movies are becoming a seamless part of the cultural fabric of cinematic hindsight.
In the digital age, it becomes increasingly easy to refurbish old footage into technically smooth productions and to revivify former memories while retroactively adjusting them to present levels of knowledge and cultural forms. Indeed, digital video in many ways destabilizes the supposed 'naturalness' of analogue video, as an emerging digital infrastructure shifts the center of gravity from simply shooting to complete processing, and from image-sound recordings to multi-media productions. Today's computer hardware and software allows for affordable near-professional standards of editing and full-fledged productions, complete with subtitles, sound, and sophisticated montage, to be completed on personal computers in our private homes. Burned onto a DVD, the family's summer vacation in Cuba is now an audio-visual product that may compete technically and stylistically with travel programs featured on television. And multimedia productions on DVD break with inscribed codes of sequential episodes, allowing past and present images-even if shot in different technical modes-to merge in a smooth media product.
New technological devices, such as the digital camcorder, the world wide web, the webcam, the DVD, and the compact disc are of course not in and of themselves triggers for new cultural forms. As James Moran rightly argues, a medium is both a material and a social construct, whose metaphors and models provide a horizon for decoding present knowledge: (Beattie, 2004; Lane, 2002) , the camera keeps rolling as siblings engage in heated disputes at the dining table. Mother Elaine often begs to turn off the camera, but the men clearly hold sway over the camera, ignoring her requests. David and Jesse take turns in filming family rows but they also record remarkable moments of frivolous acting-a sense of humor that obviously causes father and sons to bond. The video camera, evidently deployed to capture life-as-it-is, turns out to be just as unreliable as the old home movie camera capturing life-as-it-was. Both home modes record a version of reality that later paradoxically serves as a desired benchmark for truth-whether this truth is a memory of ideal family life or a memory of a family at the verge of total disintegration because of false allegations.
The third type of footage, on-camera interviews conducted by director Andrew Jarecki, reframes and unsettles the documentary evidence offered by pieces from the Hakman discretely erases all compromising evidence from the deceased's ultimate portrait: the delete function turns out to be the cutter's most important re-memory tool.
The result is a sanitized life in review, a public version of a family man with a brilliant career. Although every re-memory visitor understands the subtext of this film, the dark side of Bannister's life remains invisible to the public eye. The ultimate home movie is everything but a 'true' memory of the deceased's life. Like any film, this one is a mediated construction rather than a concatenation of 'pure' registrations of 'authentic' past events; after all, the editor defines both the choice and order of scenes. By definition, the retrospective captures the idealized family, and by removing painful episodes of adultery and incest, the family's memory is literally cleansed of its troubled past.
Director Naim takes Deleuze's idea of the brain as screen very literally: the eye is the camera; the home movie is allegedly shot straight from the visual cortex. 
Cinematic hindsight in the future
Cinematic productions incorporating real or fictive home movies provide a running commentary on the status of 'home modes' as audiovisual reconstructions of family life.
According to James Moran, the home mode is a techno-social construct in which concepts of 'family' and 'home', are intricately intertwined, at once revising old notions of memory and media and anticipating new ones. Changing technologies (first 8mm film, then video, now camcorders) are instrumental to the construction of familial memories-images of how a family was, how it presents itself, and how it wants to remember and be remembered in the future. At the same time, conventional formsboth fiction and non-fiction genres-inherently shape our home modes, molding private footage to fit or thwart dominant cultural molds. In Moran's view, the future of cinematic hindsight is likely to be determined by our tools for remembering as much as by the cultural forms informing our imagination.
Beyond Moran's techno-cultural thesis, it is imperative to consider the brain/mind as a contributing factor to the construction of cinematic hindsight.
Gilles Deleuze (2003) has stated that cinema makes the invisible perceivable; in movies, past reconstructions and future projections materialize into image sequences, which in turn feed the viewer's imagination. Cinema is a matter of 'neuro-physiological vibrations' where the image 'must produce a shock, a nerve wave which gives rise to thought ' (2003: 167) . The cultural forms we produce, whether home movies or science fiction films, are at once the result of, and input for, our 'brainwaves.' The future of cinematic hindsight is therefore also contingent on the mind's shaping power of past and present film productions-a shaping power that leads Mark Hansen to shift his focus to the 'post-cinematic problem of framing information in order to create (embodied) digital images ' (2004: 270) .
With the advent of digital camcorders and advanced digital editing facilities, our awareness of moving images serving as input for future audiovisual reconstructions is likely to become even more prevalent. The rapidly growing cultural practice to record one's life audiovisually by means of ever more digital instruments, combined with the innate inclination of human memory to select and reinterpret the past, presages the immanent expansion of cinematic retrospection. Bolstering this trend is the growing interest of people in multi-media productions that galvanize their remembrance after death; like artists or actors, we want to secure an eternal place in the virtual universe (Veale, 2004) . Personal 'live' recordings of someone's life increasingly resemble fashionable television formats or conventional film genres. A perfect example is the popularity of 'memorial videos' as part of a funeral experience. Businesses like 'Life on Tape' and 'Precious Memories' offer the possibility to turn pictures and home video footage into a smooth five-minute eulogy to be screened during the memorial service or to be burned on a DVD as a gift to family and friends after the funeral. 8 Reminiscent of the fictive re-memorial in THE FINAL CUT, the five minute eulogy proffers a seamless blend of personal (moving) images into a standard format of pre-selected soft-focused imagery, complemented by the deceased's music of choice. A recent trend to shoot and edit your own memorial movie while still alive and edit the footage into a memorial video-which not coincidentally resembles the biopics of public figures broadcast on television upon their death-seems the next stage in the construction of cinematic hindsight.
Mental projections, technical imagineering, and cultural imaginations can hardly be analyzed as separate manifestations of audiovisual remembrance. Therefore, we need both Deleuze's and Hansen's concepts exploring the construction of memory at the junction of mind and technology, and Moran's constructivist theories analyzing the home mode at the intersection of technology and culture. Cinematic constructions of hindsight are the result of concerted efforts to save and shape our private pasts in a way that befits our publicly formatted present and that steers our projected futures.
Combining cognitive philosophical and social constructivist perspectives, we will be better equipped to understand future constellations of cinematic hindsight as the multifarious products of mind, technology, and culture.
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